

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 BONN 06943 01 OF 05 141818Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----016832 141820Z /43

O R 141731Z APR 78
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7703
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USNATO
USNMR SHAPE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY ROME

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BONN 06943

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PEPR PARM MNUC GW OVIP (BROWN, HAROLD)
SUBJECT: SECRETARY BROWN'S DISCUSSIONS WITH MINISTER
APEL: STRATEGIC SITUATION

BEGIN SUMMARY. IN HIS OPENING PRESENTATION ON THE
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SECRET

PAGE 02 BONN 06943 01 OF 05 141818Z

STRATEGIC SITUATION AT THE APRIL 13 PLENARY SESSION IN
BONN, SECRETARY BROWN NOTED THE ROUGH EQUIVALENCE OF
STRATEGIC FORCES AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR AN IMPROVE-
MENT IN NATO CONVENTIONAL FORCES. DEFENSE
MINISTER APEL AGREED WITH THE NECESSITY FOR FURTHER
EFFORT IN THE CONVENTIONAL SECTOR, BUT DOUBTED THAT NATO
WOULD EVER BE ABLE TO REACH EQUALITY WITH THE WARSAW

PACT. IT WAS THUS ESSENTIAL, HE SAID, FOR THE EAST TO KNOW THAT A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK RISKED A NUCLEAR RESPONSE.

APEL EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT SALT II WOULD BE SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED; FAILURE WOULD CREATE A DIFFICULT SITUATION, BECAUSE CONTINUANCE OF DETENTE WAS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF GERMAN POLICY. SALT II SUCCESS WOULD, HOWEVER, MEAN STRATEGIC EQUALITY AND WOULD RAISE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INCREASED THREAT FROM THE SOVIETS IN THE THEATER NUCLEAR FIELD. APEL THUS THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO MODERNIZE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES AND ASKED WHAT THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE ERW DECISION WOULD MEAN IN THIS REGARD.

SECRETARY BROWN DESCRIBED SOME OF THE POSSIBILITIES FOR TNF MODERNIZATION BUT POINTED OUT THAT WHETHER THEY WERE REALIZED OR NOT WOULD BE A COMPLICATED DECISION FOR THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE TO MAKE. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE US TO KNOW THE WISHES OF THE FRG AND THE OTHER ALLIES, AND IT WOULD ALSO BE NECESSARY TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHAT SUCH DEVELOPMENTS AS PRODUCING AND STATIONING GLCM'S IN EUROPE WOULD MEAN FOR SALT AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS. APEL ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEED FOR THE US TO KNOW THE POSITION OF ITS ALLIES AND EXPRESSED READINESS TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS. HE REFERRED TO THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BONN 06943 01 OF 05 141818Z

CHANCELLOR'S PREOCCUPATION WITH THE SS-20 THREAT AND ALSO TO THE INSECURITY WHICH CAME FROM UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE SOVIET VIEWS ON DETENTE IN THE POST-BREZHNEV ERA. IT WAS IMPORTANT, APEL SAID, FOR THE ALLIANCE NOT TO FORECLOSE ANY OPTIONS. OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED DURING THE PLENARY SESSIONS ARE REPORTED BY SEPTELS.
END SUMMARY.

1. IN THE PLENARY DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE US AND FRG DELEGATIONS AT THE FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ON THE AFTERNOON OF APRIL 13, MINISTER APEL INVITED SECRETARY BROWN TO OPEN DISCUSSION OF THE FIRST AGENDA ITEM WITH A PRESENTATION ON THE STRATEGIC SITUATION.

2. SECRETARY BROWN FIRST ADDRESSED THE STRATEGIC FORCE BALANCE, EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT THERE WAS A ROUGH EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR IN STRATEGIC FORCES. HE RECOGNIZED THAT IF THE SOVIET UNION WERE ABLE TO WIN A THERMONUCLEAR WAR, OR THOUGHT IT WAS, OR WERE PERCEIVED BY ITSELF AND BY OTHERS AS HAVING A PREDOMINANCE OF STRATEGIC FORCES, THE EFFECT ON THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE AND THE REST OF THE

WORLD WOULD BE MOST PROFOUND. THE IMPRESSION
THAT THE SOVIET UNION IN RECENT YEARS WAS GAINING SUCH A
PREDOMINANCE WAS, IN HIS VIEW, MISTAKEN. WHILE THE
SOVIETS WERE CATCHING UP, THE US HAD IN FACT
THROUGH NEW SYSTEMS SUCH AS MIRV IMPROVED ITS OWN
POSITION AS WELL.

SECRET

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PAGE 01 BONN 06943 02 OF 05 141749Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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O R 141731Z APR 78
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7704
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USNATO
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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 05 BONN 06943

EXDIS

3. SECRETARY BROWN CONTINUED THAT IT SHOULD BE
NOTED THAT, TO THE EXTENT THERE WAS CONCERN ABOUT A
POSSIBLE STRATEGIC FORCE IMBALANCE WITH THE SOVIETS,
IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REDRESS THE BALANCE IN THE
1980'S THROUGH SUCH MEASURES AS DEPLOYING ALCM'S, NEW

CRUISE MISSILE CARRIERS, THE MX, AND THE TRIDENT.
HE RECOGNIZED, HOWEVER, THAT, AS THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR
BALANCE AND THE THEATER NUCLEAR BALANCE BECAME ABOUT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BONN 06943 02 OF 05 141749Z

EQUAL, THE PAST DEPENDENCE OF THE WEST ON BEING AHEAD
IN BOTH OF THESE AREAS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR EQUALITY IN
CONVENTIONAL FORCES WAS NO LONGER POSSIBLE. IF WE WERE
TO AVOID A SITUATION BY THE LATE 1980'S IN WHICH THE
SOVIETS WERE ABOUT EQUAL IN STRATEGIC AND THEATER
NUCLEAR FORCES AND FAR AHEAD IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES, IT
WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DO A GREAT DEAL TO IMPROVE
CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THE PROBLEM HERE WAS ONE OF COST,
AS CONVENTIONAL FORCES WERE MUCH MORE EXPENSIVE THAN
STRATEGIC FORCES.

4. NOTING THAT BY MOST MEASUREMENTS -- TANKS,
ARTILLERY, FIREPOWER -- THE SOVIETS COULD EXPECT TO

HAVE A TWO-TO-ONE CONVENTIONAL ADVANTAGE, SECRETARY
BROWN STATED THAT THAT WAS NOT ENOUGH FOR THEM TO BE
CONFIDENT THAT THEY COULD BREAK THROUGH ALLIED FORCES,
BUT ENOUGH THAT WE COULD NOT BE CONFIDENT THAT THEY
COULD NOT DO SO. NATO HAD TAKEN SEVERAL USEFUL STEPS
IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD, SUCH AS IMPROVING THE ANTI-
TANK CAPABILITY AND MODERNIZING FORCES, BUT ITS
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE HAD BEEN SLIPPING AND WE COULD
NO LONGER RELY SOLELY ON THAT ADVANTAGE.

5. THE NATO TRIAD OF FORCES, SECRETARY BROWN SAID, WAS
INDIVISIBLE, AND NO ONE ELEMENT COULD FULLY SUBSTITUTE
FOR ANOTHER. THE QUESTION BEFORE THE ALLIANCE WAS HOW
TO DO MORE TO IMPROVE CONVENTIONAL FORCES. HE NOTED
THAT THAT WAS THE AIM OF THE LONG TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM
(LTDP), WHICH WAS TO BE DISCUSSED LATER ON THE AGENDA.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BONN 06943 02 OF 05 141749Z

6. IN RESPONDING FIRST FOR THE GERMAN SIDE, GENERAL
WUST, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE ARMED SERVICES, EXPRESSED
COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH THE SECRETARY'S JUDGMENT ON
THE BALANCE. THE PROBLEM, HE SAID, WAS NOT IN MAIN-
TAINING THE TRIAD BUT IN DEALING WITH GRAY AREA
SYSTEMS. HE ASKED WHETHER THE US FULLY INTENDED TO

MAINTAIN THE THEATER NUCLEAR BALANCE BY THREATENING THE SS-20 WITH STRATEGIC WEAPONS, NOTING THAT THE SS-20 POSED A GREAT DISADVANTAGE FOR THE WEST. WITH REGARD TO CONVENTIONAL FORCES, GENERAL WUST THOUGHT THE WEST WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO EQUAL THE EAST IN QUANTITY AND RAISED THE QUESTION OF HOW LONG WE COULD MAINTAIN THE ADVANTAGE IN QUALITY, IF AT ALL. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE LTDP WOULD PRODUCE RESULTS.

7. MINISTER APEL THEN REFERRED TO SALT, STATING THAT HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT A SALT II AGREEMENT WOULD BE CONCLUDED. ALTHOUGH HE COULD NOT JUDGE WHETHER THERE WOULD BE DIFFICULTY WITH RATIFICATION IN THE SENATE BECAUSE OF THE ENHANCED RADIATION WARHEAD DECISION, HE THOUGHT AND HOPED THAT SALT II WOULD BE A SUCCESS. INDEED, THE SITUATION WOULD BE DIFFICULT IF IT WERE NOT, AS DETENTE WAS ONE OF THE ESSENTIALS OF GERMAN POLICY.

8. IF, HOWEVER, SALT II WERE A SUCCESS, APEL CONTINUED, THE QUESTION WOULD BECOME WHETHER THE SOVIETS COULD USE THE RESULTANT STRATEGIC EQUALITY TO POSE A THREAT IN THE THEATER NUCLEAR FIELD. HE THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL TO MODERNIZE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES AND WAS PLEASED TO LEARN THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD EXPRESSED READINESS TO DO SO. THE FRG, HE STATED, FELT A REAL THREAT FROM THE SS-20 AND ALSO HAD CONCERNS ABOUT CRUISE MISSILES AND BACKFIRE.

9. APEL AGREED THAT FURTHER EFFORT WAS NEEDED IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD, AND NOTED THAT HIS PREDECESSOR,
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 BONN 06943 02 OF 05 141749Z

FORMER MINISTER LEBER, HAD DONE A GOOD JOB; THE NUMBER OF NEW WEAPONS WHICH WERE ON LINE WAS ENORMOUS. NEVERTHELESS, HE DOUBTED THAT THE ALLIANCE COULD EVER STRENGTHEN THE CONVENTIONAL PART OF THE TRIAD TO ANYTHING APPROACHING EQUALITY. IT THUS REMAINED ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR THE WARSAW PACT TO KNOW THAT IT RISKED THE USE OF THE NUCLEAR PART OF THE TRIAD IF IT STARTED A CONVENTIONAL WAR IN EUROPE. IF IT WERE OUR

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 01 BONN 06943 03 OF 05 141801Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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O R 141731Z APR 78
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7705
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USNATO
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AMEMBASSY ROME

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 05 BONN 06943

EXDIS

STRATEGIC GOAL TO FIGHT THE SOVIETS ONLY BY CONVENTIONAL
MEANS, THE FEELING MIGHT GROW IN EUROPE THAT A PROXY
WAR COULD TAKE PLACE HERE ALSO. IT THUS WAS IMPORTANT
TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT THE US UNDERSTOOD THE GRAY ZONE
PROBLEM AND THAT THE LINKAGE BETWEEN STRATEGIC AND
TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES THAT WAS ACCEPTED IN ATHENS
IN 1962 WAS MAINTAINED.

10. SECRETARY BROWN RESPONDED BY NOTING FIRST THAT, IN THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BONN 06943 03 OF 05 141801Z

OVER-ALL COMPETITION WITH THE EAST, WE WERE UNABLE TO
UTILIZE MILITARY SUPERIORITY. AS OUR GOVERNMENTS
RESPONDED TO PUBLIC OPINION, OUR OWN VIEWS OF WHAT WAS
PROPER MEANT THAT EVEN WITH DOUBLE MILITARY STRENGTH
WE WOULD NOT BE GREATLY HELPED. FOR THE SOVIETS,
MILITARY PREPONDERANCE WAS MORE IMPORTANT, AND THEY
WOULD BE LESS INHIBITED ABOUT USING IT, EITHER IN FACT

OR AS A THREAT. WHILE IT MADE NO SENSE FOR US TO DO MORE THAN STAY ROUGHLY EVEN IN MILITARY STRENGTH, IT WAS OF COURSE ESSENTIAL TO DO THAT MUCH.

11. AS A SECOND POINT, SECRETARY BROWN EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE TRIAD WAS A SEAMLESS WEB AND THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO HAVE A COMPARABLE CAPABILITY TO THAT OF THE OTHER SIDE IN EACH OF THE THREE ELEMENTS. IN STRATEGIC FORCES, WE WERE ROUGHLY EQUAL. IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES, WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO PAY THE PRICE OF EQUALITY, BUT ABSOLUTE EQUALITY WAS NOT ESSENTIAL AS WE WOULD NOT NEED THE CAPABILITY TO INVADE THE OTHER SIDE. WHAT WAS NECESSARY WAS THE ABILITY TO PREVENT THEIR THINKING THEY COULD BREAK THROUGH AND GAIN TERRITORY TOO QUICKLY FOR THE ALLIANCE TO BE ABLE TO MOVE TO A NUCLEAR RESPONSE. WE WERE NOT SEEKING THE CAPABILITY TO FIGHT BY CONVENTIONAL MEANS FOR, SAY, AN ENTIRE YEAR.

12. APEL INTERRUPTED TO ASK WHAT THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH HIS ERW DECISION MEANT IN TERMS OF MODERNIZATION OF THE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE ELEMENT OF THE TRIAD. SECRETARY BROWN SAID IN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BONN 06943 03 OF 05 141801Z

RESPONSE THAT HE WOULD FIRST LIKE TO DISPOSE OF A COUPLE OF FANTASIES. FIRST, SOME WEST EUROPEANS, AND POSSIBLY SOME EAST EUROPEANS, HAVE A NIGHTMARE THAT THE US AND THE USSR MIGHT AGREE TO FIGHT A NUCLEAR WAR ENTIRELY OUTSIDE THEIR TERRITORIES. SECOND, SOME IN THE US, AND PERHAPS SOME IN THE SOVIET UNION, HAVE THE NIGHTMARE THAT A THERMONUCLEAR WAR MIGHT BE FOUGHT SOLELY ON THEIR TERRITORIES, LEAVING EUROPE UNTOUCHED. WHILE NEITHER OF THESE SITUATIONS COULD, IN HIS VIEW, OCCUR, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO LET ANY ONE OF THE THREE ELEMENTS OF THE TRIAD GET TOO FAR OUT OF BALANCE. HE NOTED THAT MOST OF THE TARGETS IN THE WARSAW PACT ARE TARGETTED NOT ONLY BY THEATER FORCES BUT ALSO BY US STRATEGIC FORCES.

13. SECRETARY BROWN CONTINUED THAT THE LTDP TASK FORCE WHICH HAD LOOKED INTO THE PROBLEM HAD CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS A NEED TO LOOK AT THE LONGER-RANGE PART OF THE THEATER NUCLEAR BALANCE. AS FOR WHAT COULD BE DONE FOR MODERNIZATION OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES, THE SECRETARY MENTIONED VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES SUCH AS GLCM'S AND, OVER A LONGER TIMEFRAME, MOBILE

MISSILES. WHETHER TO TAKE SUCH STEPS WOULD BE A COMPLICATED DECISION FOR THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE TO MAKE. HE HOPED THAT THE HISTORY OF THE NEUTRON BOMB DIALOGUE WOULD NOT OFFER AN EXAMPLE FOR A DECISION OF THAT SORT. BUT THE US DID NOT KNOW THE VIEWS OF THE FRG AND THE OTHER ALLIES ON SUCH ISSUES AS WHETHER THE ALLIANCE SHOULD HAVE CRUISE MISSILES OR MOBILE MISSILES, OR WHAT WAS MEANT BY "MEDIUM-RANGE" (1500 KM, WHICH WOULD COVER THE WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS, OR 2500 KM, WHICH WOULD REACH MOSCOW). HOW HEAVILY WAS THE ALLIANCE PREPARED TO WEIGH THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF SUCH DEVELOPMENTS -- WHICH WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY GIVE THE SOVIETS GREAT CONCERN -- ON SALT? THE US DID NOT HAVE THE ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS AND HAD NOT YET HEARD
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 BONN 06943 03 OF 05 141801Z

ANY ANSWERS FROM ITS ALLIES, BUT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO FACE UP TO THE ISSUES BEFORE TOO LONG. THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES AND TO PARTICIPATE IN ALLIANCE DECISIONS, BUT IT WOULD BE

SECRET

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PAGE 01 BONN 06943 04 OF 05 141808Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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O R 141731Z APR 78
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7706
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USNATO
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AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY ROME

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 05 BONN 06943

EXDIS

UNABLE TO STATE THAT IT WAS PREPARED TO PRODUCE GLCM'S
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLIES WOULD BE PREPARED LATER TO
ACCEPT THEM ON THEIR SOIL.

14. MINISTER APEL REFERRED BRIEFLY TO THE ERW
DECISION, STATING THAT IF IT HAD BEEN MADE SEVEN OR
EIGHT MONTHS AGO, BEFORE THE PUBLIC DEBATE, IT WOULD
HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY ALL AND MIGHT EVEN HVE BEEN
USEFUL AS A BARGAINING WEAPON. HE PERSONALLY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BONN 06943 04 OF 05 141808Z

DOUBTED THAT THIS WOULD EVER BE THE CASE NOW -- ALTHOUGH
HE WOULD NEVER SAY SO PUBLICLY AND, INDEED, THE
BUNDESTAG HAD JUST PASSED A RESOLUTION STATING THE
CONTRARY. MEANWHILE, THERE REMAINED THE SS-20 QUESTION,
AND THERE WAS NO BARGAINING POWER ON THE
WESTERN SIDE. THERE WAS A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE
IDEA OF USING ERW AS A BARGINING CHIP FOR THE SS-20
WAS REALISTIC, BUT HE DID NOT PROPOSE TO DISCUSS THAT
QUESTION HERE. MEANWHILE, THE SS-20 THREAT REMAINED
AND THE CHANCELLOR WAS PERSONALLY PREOCCUPIED WITH IT,
MORE SO THAN WITH TANKS. THE FRG DID NOT HAVE THE
NATIONAL MEANS OF COUNTERING IT. IT MUST DISCUSS IN
THE ALLIANCE WHAT COULD BE DONE. HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE
US NEEDED TO KNOW THE ATTITUDE OF ITS ALLIES, AND THE
FRG WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS IT.

15. SECRETARY BROWN AGREED THAT IT WAS
NECESSARY TO DISCUSS WHAT COULD BE DONE ABOUT THE SS-20.
HE RECOGNIZED THAT SUCH THINGS AS GLCM'S WERE NOT A
MILITARY ANSWER, AS THEY COULD NOT DESTROY THE SS-20,
BUT THAT THEY CONCEIVABLY COULD BE A POLITICAL ANSWER.
AT THE SAME TIME, IT WAS NECESSARY TO RECOGNIZE THAT
CRUISE MISSILES WERE SOMETHING THAT TROUBLED THE
SOVIETS A GREAT DEAL -- MORE SO THAN THE ERW, WHICH
REPRESENTED A TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY BUT DID NOT
PARTICULARLY THREATEN THE SOVIETS. LARGE NUMBERS OF
EUROPEAN-BASED CRUISE MISSILES WOULD NOT JUST EVOKE A

PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN BUT WOULD RISK LOWERING THE EAST-
WEST TEMPERATURE BY SEVERAL DEGREES. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT
COULD JEOPARDIZE SALT, AND IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO
THINK ABOUT IT CAREFULLY.

16. GENERAL ALTENBURG, CHIEF OF THE
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SECRET

PAGE 03 BONN 06943 04 OF 05 141808Z

POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS SECTION IN THE FMOD, NOTED
THAT THE SECRETARY HAD ASKED WHAT THE FRG VIEWS WERE
ON THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE IMPROVEMENTS. HE POINTED OUT
THAT THE SOVIETS HAD DEVELOPED SYSTEMS -- THE SS-20 --
WHICH THREATENED EUROPE BUT WHICH WERE OUTSIDE OF SALT
AND OF MBFR. IN THE GERMAN VIEW, HE SAID, THE SOVIETS
SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT SOMETHING IN EUROPE THAT
COULD NEUTRALIZE AND OFFSET THAT INCREASED THREAT.
THE FRG WOULD WISH TO MAINTAIN OPTIONS FOR NEUTRALIZING
THE POTENTIAL OF THE SOVIET SYSTEMS TARGETTED ON EUROPE
EVEN IN THE FUTURE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SACEUR HAD
THAT POSSIBILITY NOW BUT QUESTIONED WHETHER HE WOULD
CONTINUE TO HAVE IT IN THE FUTURE. HE REFERRED TO THE
POSSIBILITY OF NATO DEVELOPING A MRBM POTENTIAL AND
REFERRED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING THE CRUISE
MISSILE OPTION OPEN.

17. SECRETARY BROWN REAFFIRMED THAT THE US WAS CLEARLY
MAINTAINING ITS OPTIONS IN SALT. WHILE THE PROTOCOL

SECRET

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PAGE 01 BONN 06943 05 OF 05 141818Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----016853 141823Z /43
O R 141731Z APR 78
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7707
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USNATO

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S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 05 BONN 06943

EXDIS

WOULD LIMIT DEPLOYMENT THROUGH 1980, THERE WERE NO LIMITATIONS BEYOND THAT. THE SOVIETS WOULD OF COURSE PUSH VERY HARD TO EXTEND THE DEPLOYMENT BAN, BUT THE QUESTION WOULD BE WHAT THE POLITICAL SITUATION WAS WHEN THE PROTOCOL EXPIRED.

18. MINISTER APEL ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING OPTIONS OPEN, PUTTING IT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP SITUATION. HE STATED THAT IT WAS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BONN 06943 05 OF 05 141818Z

HIS FIRM BELIEF THAT BREZHNEV, WHO WOULD BE IN BONN IN MAY, WAS ATTACHED TO DETENTE. WHILE IT WAS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THE RESULTS OF DETENTE HAD BEEN AS GREAT AS HE HAD THOUGHT THEY MIGHT BE, IT STILL SEEMED THAT, SO LONG AS BREZHNEV LIVED, THERE WAS A CHANCE THAT DETENTE WAS MORE THAN JUST A WORD. NEVERTHELESS, THE FACT THAT NO ONE KNEW WHAT THE SITUATION WOULD BE FIVE YEARS HENCE, IN THE POST-BREZHNEV PERIOD, INCREASED INSECURITY. IT WAS NECESSARY FOR US TO BE PREPARED FOR A SITUATION IN WHICH THE POLITICAL CLIMATE WAS CHANGED. HIS FEELING, BOTH PERSONAL AND POLITICAL, WAS THAT WE MUST NOT LOSE ANY CAPABILITY, EITHER BY AGREEMENT OR OTHERWISE, TO BE PREPARED FOR CHANGES IN THAT CLIMATE IN EITHER DIRECTION.

19. SECRETARY BROWN STATED THAT HE RECOGNIZED AND SHARED THE CONCERN EXPRESSED BY MINISTER APEL THAT THE US SHOULD NOT ONLY SIGN AWAY ITS OPTIONS BY AGREEMENT OR BY UNILATERAL ACTION. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE CONCERN WAS LARGELY A POLITICAL ONE, AS THE NUMBER OF

WARHEADS AVAILABLE IN US STRATEGIC FORCES WAS ENOUGH
TO TAKE CARE OF WHAT WOULD BE TARGETED BY IMPROVED
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES.

20. STATE SECRETARY SCHNELL, WHO TOOK THE CHAIR
TEMPORARILY WHEN MINISTER APEL AND STATE SECRETARIES
VON BUELOW AND HIEHLE WERE CALLED AWAY FOR A VOTE IN THE
BUNDESTAG, ASKED HOW MUCH TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR THE
US TO DEVELOP A MRBM AND WHETHER THE US INTENDED TO DO
SO. SECRETARY BROWN REPLIED THAT DEVELOPMENT TIME WOULD
BE ABOUT TEN YEARS. HE STATED THAT HE HAD ASKED THE AIR
FORCE FOR A PLAN BUT THAT NO DECISIONS TO DEVELOP A
MRBM HAD BEEN MADE. STOESSEL

SECRET

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PAGE 03 BONN 06943 05 OF 05 141818Z

SECRET

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 14 apr 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978BONN06943
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780161-0277
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From: BONN
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Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 12
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
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Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
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Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2965873
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SECRETARY BROWN'S DISCUSSIONS WITH MINISTER APEL: STRATEGIC SITUATION BEGIN SUMMARY. IN HIS OPENING PRESENTATION ON THE
TAGS: PEPR, PARM, MNUC, OVIP, GE, (BROWN, HAROLD), (APEL, HANS)
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Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014